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I.

INTRODUCTION
In June of 2017, representatives from roughly seventy tax jurisdictions
from around the world signed the Multilateral Convention to Implement
Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting
(The “Multilateral Instrument” or “MLI.”).1 To date, a total of seventyeight countries have signed the MLI.2 The MLI is one of the more recent
outgrowths of the OECD’s Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (“BEPS”)
*

J.D./L.L.M. in Taxation, Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, 2019; B.A., Cedarville
University, 2016. I am grateful to the editors and staff of the Northwestern Journal of
International Law and Business for catching my errors and otherwise improving this article.
I am also indebted to Professor David Cameron and my mom and dad for their help and
encouragement in writing this article.
1
Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent BEPS,
OECD, http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/multilateral-convention-to-implement-tax-treatyrelated-measures-to-prevent-beps.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2017).
2
Signatories and Parties to the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty
Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD (last visited Jan. 24,
2018), http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/beps-mli-signatories-and-parties.pdf.
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Project that was announced in 2012.3 The general purpose of the BEPS
Project was to reduce BEPS, which the OECD defines as “tax avoidance
strategies that exploit gaps and mismatches in tax rules to artificially shift
profits to low or no-tax locations.”4 In essence, the BEPS Project seeks to
eliminate instances of what is often referred to as “double non-taxation”:
circumstances in which income is connected with two (or potentially more)
jurisdictions, neither of which impose a tax on it.5
The MLI is intended to advance several of the “action steps” that the
OECD has identified as necessary to address what the OECD identifies as
the increasing problem of BEPS.6 It does this by modifying existing
bilateral tax treaties between tax jurisdictions. Where two jurisdictions that
have signed a tax treaty have also signed the MLI both indicate that they
desire the MLI to apply to that same treaty, that treaty becomes a “covered
tax agreement.” Covered tax agreements are then subject to at least some of
the provisions of the MLI that intend to reduce BEPS based on which
provisions the jurisdictions have each adopted.7
Therein lies one of the deficiencies of the MLI. The MLI does contain
language that addresses some of the OECD’s concerns about BEPS. In that
way, it may very well signal an international desire to challenge BEPS in a
more cooperative fashion than before.8 However, the MLI ultimately does
not require jurisdictions to commit to eliminating double non-taxation
scenarios, nor does it provide a mandatory enforcement mechanism for
ensuring double non-taxation is eliminated without producing doubletaxation.9 In fact, very little of the MLI is mandatory, and it is worth
considering the reality that many of the signees have not adopted some of
the most impactful provisions of the MLI. Thus, the MLI largely continues
to rely on the voluntary actions of the nations involved in it to address and
eliminate double non-taxation scenarios. As voluntary resolution of double
3
See OECD, Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD PUBLISHING
(2013), https://www.oecd.org/ctp/BEPSActionPlan.pdf (hereinafter Action Plan).
4
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/ (last visited
Nov. 9, 2017).
5
Action Plan, supra note 3, at 10.
6
Id.
7
Frequently Asked Questions on the Multilateral Instrument (MLI), OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/MLI-frequently-asked-questions.pdf (last visited Nov. 9,
2017).
8
See Itai Grinberg, The New International Tax Diplomacy, 104 GEO. L.J. 1137, 11761177 (2016).
9
See Org. for Econ. Co-Operation and Dev., Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax
Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD (June 7 2017),
http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/multilateral-convention-to-implement-tax-treaty-relatedmeasures-to-prevent-BEPS.pdf.; see also OECD: Countries sign multilateral instrument,
implementing BEPS in tax treaties, KPMG (June 7, 2017), https://home.kpmg.com/
xx/en/home/insights/2017/06/tnf-oecd-countries-sign-multilateral-instrument-implementingbeps-in-tax-treaties.html.
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non-taxation scenarios may conflict with the policies of many developing
tax jurisdictions as well as those that generate the highest tax revenue, the
MLI is unlikely to significantly reduce BEPS by itself. Because it relies on
voluntary cooperation between tax jurisdictions on addressing BEPS, the
MLI will generally be ineffective at reducing BEPS.
The first part of this paper will examine the objectives of the BEPS
Project and outputs of the BEPS Project intended to achieve those
objectives, including the BEPS Action Plan of 2013. The second part will
examine the MLI itself and what exactly the document requires of its
signees. The third part of this paper will examine the limits of the MLI
itself. Finally, the fourth part of this paper will examine some of the main
reasons why countries are likely to resist taking decisive action against
BEPS and discusses some possible actions that may be more effective at
advancing BEPS Project objectives.
II.

THE BEPS PROJECT
The MLI is one of the latest outputs of the OECD’s BEPS Project.
Simply put, the stated objective of the OECD’s BEPS Project is to reduce
BEPS. However, the OECD has generally avoided putting too fine of a
point on what exactly BEPS is.10 As described earlier, the OECD defines
BEPS broadly as strategies for avoiding taxation that “exploit gaps and
mismatches in tax rules to artificially shift profits to low or no-tax
jurisdictions.”11 This broad definition is likely in part because the OECD
intends BEPS to encapsulate a broad range of tax avoidance maneuvers,
including, but not limited to, shifting income between jurisdictions using
transfer pricing and shifting income between jurisdictions through the use
of legal entities that serve little function beyond shifting the income.12 The
OECD identifies a main concern of the BEPS Project to be double nontaxation scenarios.13
The OECD provides an example of one particular form of BEPS to
illustrate the behavior. Suppose a business is organized as a corporation in
Country A. It may have a wholly-owned subsidiary in Country B. The
corporation in Country A owns intellectual property that it wants to license
to the corporation in Country B. However, both Country A and Country B
10

See Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, supra note 4; see also Action Plan, supra note
3, at 7-11.
11 Action Plan, supra note 3, at 10.
12 See Robert G. Rinninsland & Kenneth Lobo, US-Based Pushback on BEPS, 43
INTERTAX 96, 10-11 (2015); see also OECD, Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting,
OECD PUBLISHING (2013) at 10, http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/
taxation/addressing-base-erosion-and-profit-shifting_9789264192744-en#.WfuOEDFe6Uk#
page3.
13 See OECD, Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD PUBLISHING (2013)
at 10, http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/taxation/addressing-baseerosion-and-profit-shifting_9789264192744-en#.WfuOEDFe6Uk#page3.
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have relatively high marginal tax rates on the income that would be
generated to the parent from licensing this intellectual property.
Accordingly, the business incorporates a third entity in Country C, which
has very low taxes on this type of income. This third entity then holds the
IP, the income from which may largely be taxable in Country C instead of
Country A and B, even though the parties have no other presence in
Country C.
Although BEPS has existed for decades, the OECD’s efforts to reduce
it are relatively recent. The OECD cites the League of Nations as
identifying problems with double-taxation scenarios in the international
context in the 1920s.14 Indeed, the OECD identifies President John F.
Kennedy as observing the phenomenon of businesses minimizing their tax
liability through “artificial arrangements” among related entities in 1961.15
However, little was historically done to prevent BEPS.16
A number of more recent developments motivated the international
community to take action to prevent BEPS. As businesses have continued
to become more global in scope and reach, BEPS is believed to have
become more prevalent.17 Additionally, developments in computer and
telecommunications technology in recent decades have made it easier for
business enterprises to engage in activities that may affect the tax
jurisdiction in which they report income without substantively changing
where business activities take place.18 Indeed, these technological
developments have made it easier for many enterprises to do business
within a tax jurisdiction without being subject to tax under traditional
income tax rules, even without special tax planning.19 Such technologies
have also increased the degree to which income is dependent on intangible
assets, and not on tangible fixed assets such as factories.20 Additionally, the
decline in government income tax revenues caused by the decline in income
during the great recession motivated many tax jurisdictions to look for
politically expedient methods of collecting additional tax revenue.21 BEPS
became a politically expedient target for increasing tax revenues, at least in
part, as a result of the media’s concentration on the issue.22
In 2012, the BEPS Project officially began when the G20 identified
BEPS as an issue that it wanted to address.23 The task of actually addressing
14

Id. at 9.
What the BEPS are we Talking About?, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/ctp/what-thebeps-are-we-talking-about.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2017).
16 Action Plan, supra note 3, at 9.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 10.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Yariv Brauner, What the BEPS?, 16 FLA. TAX REV. 55, 58 (2014).
22 Id. at 55-57.
23 Grinberg, supra note 8, at 1142.
15
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BEPS fell to the OECD, the de facto organization for governing
international tax matters.24 In 2013, the OECD published Addressing Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting, a report describing the impact of BEPS, how
BEPS occurs, and key areas that the OECD believed needed to be
addressed in order to reduce BEPS.25 After justifying its efforts to reduce
BEPS, the report identified six “key pressure areas” that needed to be
addressed in order to reduce the prevalence of BEPS: (1) jurisdictional
differences in the treatment of entities and instruments, (2) the application
of ideas from treaties to digital goods and services, (3) tax treatment of
financial transactions between related parties, (4) transfer pricing, (5) treaty
provisions intended to thwart efforts to use other treaty provisions to avoid
tax (anti-avoidance measures), and (6) the presence of tax jurisdictions that
tax income at a lower rate than other jurisdictions..2627
Also in 2013, the OECD released the Action Plan on Base Erosion and
Profit Shifting.28 This report set out fifteen actions that the OECD assessed
needed to be undertaken in order to address BEPS globally, and helped
clarify what the OECD identifies as issues that the BEPS Project seeks to
resolve.29 The OECD believes that in order to reduce BEPS, these actions
must be taken by “consensus.”30 The first action is to address various
difficulties relating to imposing taxes in a digital economy. 31 These
difficulties include those brought about by the ability of businesses to sell
their products in a tax jurisdiction without having a presence in that
jurisdiction that would subject it to taxation under traditional rules.32
Actions two through five generally strive to advance “international
coherence of corporate income taxation.”33 These actions generally address
concerns that tax laws of various jurisdictions are “mismatched” and
provide opportunities for double non-taxation.34 The actions specifically
target “hybrid mismatch agreements” (arrangements whereby businesses
can deduct the same expense in multiple tax jurisdictions, generate a
deduction without an inclusion in income, and other similar maneuvers) by
generating model treaty provisions that address these concerns as well as
developing domestic tax law recommendations to preclude these types of
tax positions.35
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35

See id.
Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, supra note 12.
Id. at 47-48.
Id.
Action Plan, supra note 3.
Id.
Id. at 10-11.
Id. at 14-15.
Id.
Id. at 15-18.
Action Plan, supra note 3, at 15-18.
Id.
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Actions six through ten focus on changing both international and
domestic tax laws so that income is generally taxed where “the economic
activity that generates that income” occurs.36 Specifically, these actions
desire to create model treaty provisions and domestic law recommendations
that prevent entities from obtaining benefits from tax treaties in
“inappropriate circumstances,”37 changing treaty definitions of permanent
establishments (PEs) to make it more difficult to avoid PE status,38 and
developing rules that help ensure that transfer pricing aligns with “value
creation.”39 These actions target what the OECD considers to be artificial
shifting of income between tax jurisdictions.
Actions eleven through fourteen focus on making taxpayer
information more available to taxing authorities.40 These actions include
setting up methodologies for gathering and analyzing data and information
on BEPS, changing the types and generally increasing the amount of
information taxpayers are required to disclose to taxing authorities, such as
aggressive tax-planning maneuvers, and ensuring that disputes between
taxing jurisdictions are conclusively resolved.41 Finally, action fifteen
endorses the development of a multilateral instrument to allow for the rapid
implementation of the OECD’s BEPS measures by incorporating them into
existing tax treaties.42 These standards focus on ensuring that tax
jurisdictions are able to apply and enforce rules and recommendations to
reduce BEPS.43
Based on these actions (particularly actions 10-14), the OECD
released the Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country
Reporting action 13 Final Report in 2015.44 This report emphasized that
giving tax authorities access to detailed information on businesses’ global
operations would help them more accurately assess the validity of transfer
pricing positions.45 The next year, the OECD made country-by-country
reporting a minimum standard requirement, effective for tax periods
beginning on or after January 1, 2016.46 Under the OECD requirements,
businesses meeting certain size thresholds must provide the taxing
authorities of countries in which they operate with certain information
36

Id. at 18-21.
Id. at 19.
38 Id. at 19-20.
39 Id. at 20-21.
40 Action Plan, supra note 3, at 21-23.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 23-24.
43
Id. at 21-24.
44 Country-By-Country Reporting: Some Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), OFFICE
OF REVENUE COMMISSIONERS (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.revenue.ie/en/companies-andcharities/documents/country-by-country-reporting.pdf.
45 Id.
46 Id.
37
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about the company (including the company’s global revenues, profits, and
taxes), broken down by tax jurisdiction.47 This requirement will facilitate
assessing the appropriateness and global consistency of tax positions taken
by global businesses.
The BEPS Project is fundamentally motivated by the belief that
existing tax laws provide too many opportunities for businesses operating
internationally to avoid tax by moving profits between tax jurisdictions
without substantively changing or moving their operations. The OECD
believes that recent developments in computer and communications
technology and the increasingly international scope of business mean that a
larger amount of income goes either untaxed or taxed at relatively low
rates.48 To reduce BEPS in order to increase tax revenues, the OECD has
laid out a number of actions that it intends to take. These essentially fall
into two categories: developing recommendations for tax jurisdictions’
domestic tax law, and developing model treaty provisions or parts of a
multilateral instrument that will address BEPS concerns. The OECD sees
these as the main methods it can use to address BEPS.
III. THE MULTILATERAL INSTRUMENT (THE “MLI”)
In November of 2016, the OECD released the language of the MLI,
with the intent that countries would begin signing it the following
summer.49 The MLI that the OECD ended up drafting seeks to address
several of the actions it identified as being key steps to reduce BEPS.50
Specifically, the MLI includes provisions that intend to advance Action
Two (“Neutralise the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Agreements”), Action
Six (“Prevent Treaty Abuse”), Action Seven (“Prevent the Artificial
Avoidance of PE Status”), Action Fourteen (“Make Dispute Resolution
Mechanisms More Effective”), and of course, Action Fifteen (“Develop a
Multilateral Instrument”).51
The MLI works by modifying existing bilateral tax treaties, that is,
treaties that are exclusively between two tax jurisdictions.52 Tax
47

Org. for Econ. Cooperation and Dev., Country-by-Country Reporting: Handbook on
Effective Implementation, (Sep. 2017), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps/country-by-countryreporting-handbook-on-effective-implementation.pdf.
48 Joint Comm. on Taxation, Background, Summary, and Implications of the
OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, (Nov. 30, 2015).
49 Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent BEPS,
supra note 1.
50 See Explanatory Statement to the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty
Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 1-7, OECD,
https://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/explanatory-statement-multilateral-convention-toimplement-tax-treaty-related-measures-to-prevent-BEPS.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2018).
51 See KPMG, supra note 9.
52 See Frequently Asked Questions on the Multilateral Instrument (MLI), supra note 7,
at 3.
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jurisdictions that sign the MLI indicate that they desire the provisions of the
MLI to apply to at least some of the tax treaties they have signed.53
However, signing tax jurisdictions need not apply the provisions of the MLI
to all of their tax treaties. Furthermore, the MLI only applies to tax treaties
signed by two parties that have both indicated their desire to have the MLI
cover that tax treaty.54 In the MLI’s language, treaties that both parties want
covered are referred to as “covered tax agreements,” or CTAs.55 Of the over
3,000 bilateral tax treaties currently in force, roughly 1,100 would become
CTAs if the signing tax jurisdictions ratify the MLI in accordance with their
currently-filed lists of reservations and notifications at the time of their
signing.56
Each of the substantive provisions of the MLI includes at least one
clause implementing a measure to reduce BEPS.57 This language is
essentially equivalent to the language developed by the OECD for its
Model Tax Convention,58 which is undergoing significant alteration to
reflect the BEPS Project.59 These provisions are found in parts II through
VI.60 Generally speaking, Part II of the MLI seeks to limit the effects of
certain types of “hybrid mismatch agreements” by limiting the degree to
which entities can obtain tax relief from both contracting jurisdictions
simultaneously.61 Part III seeks to limit “treaty abuse” by restricting the
circumstances in which taxpayers can receive certain treaty benefits.62 Part
IV includes provisions to limit the ability of PEs to avoid PE status through
what the OECD sees as artificial behavior.63 Part V features numerous
provisions to facilitate the resolution of tax disputes under a CTA.64 Finally,
Part VI provides for binding arbitration when the contracting jurisdictions
cannot reach an agreement on the CTA tax issues presented.65
More specifically, Part II of the MLI deals specifically with Action

53

See id.
See id. at 4.
55 Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting, supra note 9, at Art. 2(1)(a).
56 See KPMG, supra note 9.
57 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Haiyan Xu, A Global Tax Override? The New OECD
Multilateral Tax Instrument and Its Limits, (Univ. of Mich. Pub. Law Research, Paper No.
542, Mar. 17, 2017), at Part 2.4.
58 See id.
59 OECD, DRAFT CONTENTS OF THE 2017 UPDATE TO THE OECD MODEL TAX
CONVENTION 2 (Jul. 11, 2017).
60 Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting, supra note 9.
61 Id. at Art. 3 – Art. 5.
62 Id. at Art. 6 – Art. 11.
63 Id. at Art. 12 – Art. 15.
64 Id. at Art. 16 – Art. 17.
65 Id. at Art. 18 – Art. 26.
54
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Two and thus seeks to neutralize the effect of hybrid mismatches.66 Article
3 deals specifically with “transparent entities,” 67 or entities whose income
is taxed to the owner rather than the entity itself.68 This provision requires
signing jurisdictions to treat the income of transparent entities as income of
a resident to the extent that the jurisdiction treats such a transaction as
income.69 This provision also prohibits the contracting jurisdictions from
providing tax exemptions, credits, or deductions for taxes paid by their
residents on income that the other jurisdiction may tax, if the only basis for
the other jurisdiction’s right to tax the income is that the taxpayer is a
resident of the other jurisdiction.70 In other words, Country A is not
permitted to give tax relief to Resident 1 on income that Country B can tax
if the sole reason Country B can tax that income is that Country B views
that income as income of a resident of Country B. Under this provision, the
mere fact that an entity is a resident of one contracting jurisdiction does not
itself eliminate the other jurisdiction’s ability to tax its income. Thus, where
applied, this provision makes it more difficult for taxpayers to avoid taxes
in one jurisdiction by using a transparent entity to conduct business in that
jurisdiction.
Article 4 of the MLI addresses how contracting jurisdictions will
resolve situations in which a non-individual taxpayer appears to be a citizen
of both of the signing jurisdictions.71 It provides that if the taxing
jurisdictions both identify a taxpayer as a resident of their jurisdiction for
tax purposes, “the competent authorities” of the two jurisdictions will
“endeavor to determine by mutual agreement” which jurisdiction will be the
taxpayer’s tax residence.72 This is to be determined based on the taxpayer’s
place of effective management, place of incorporation or organization, and
“any other relevant factors.”73 In essence, Article 4 establishes a
commitment of the signing jurisdictions to try to agree on which
jurisdiction is the residence of a non-individual taxpayer.
Article 5 offers three potential options for signing tax jurisdictions to
apply in order to eliminate double taxation.74 Option A requires CTA
provisions that (in order to prevent double taxation) exempt income or
66 Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting, supra note 9, at Art. 3 – Art. 5.
67 Id. at Art. 3.
68 See Avi-Yonah & Xu, supra note 57, at 14.
69 Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting, supra note 9, at Art. 3(1).
70 Id. at Art. 3(2); Avi-Yonah & Xu, supra note 57, at 14.
71
Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting, supra note 9, at Art. 4(1).
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. at Art. 5(1). Although Article 4 is labeled as providing options for eliminating
double taxation, Options A and B appear to only target double non-taxation.
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capital of a signing jurisdiction resident to not apply in cases where the
other tax jurisdiction exempts the same income or capital (or tax it at a
lower rate than it otherwise would) using the CTA provision.75 However,
the first jurisdiction must allow a deduction for taxes paid in the second
jurisdiction under this scenario.76 In other words, both tax jurisdictions
cannot exempt from taxation or apply a reduced tax rate on the same tax
base using the same CTA agreement.
Option B requires CTA provisions that exempt income of a resident
from taxation as dividend income to not apply where that income creates a
deduction in the other tax jurisdiction.77 As in Option A, the first
jurisdiction must still provide a deduction for taxes paid in the other
jurisdiction.78 Under Option C, where a resident of one of the signing
jurisdictions derives income or owns capital which may be taxed in the
other jurisdiction, the first jurisdiction must allow a deduction for those
taxes paid to the other jurisdiction.79 Furthermore, where a provision of the
CTA exempts income or property of a resident from tax in its jurisdiction of
residence, that jurisdiction may still consider that exempt income or capital
in determining the tax on the taxpayer’s remaining income or capital.80
Each of these three options seeks to minimize the opportunities for
taxpayers to avoid tax in two jurisdictions simultaneously.
Part III of the MLI focuses on Action Six of the BEPS Project and thus
seeks to address a number of concerns regarding “Treaty Abuse.”81 Article
6 mandates a preamble to CTAs that expresses a desire to eliminate double
taxation without creating opportunities for non-taxation or reduced taxation,
and provides optional language expressing a desire to develop the economic
relationship between the two signing jurisdictions.82 Article 7 is the longest
provision of the MLI, and it deals with numerous issues pertaining Action
Six. First, it applies what is often referred to as the “principal purpose test”
to CTAs.83 This means that a taxpayer will not receive the benefits of a
CTA in a particular instance if it is reasonable to conclude that one of the
principal purposes of the arrangement or transaction that resulted in a
benefit is to obtain the CTA benefit.84 However, there are two exceptions to
this. The first permits the taxpayer to receive the CTA benefit when doing
75

Id. at Art. 5(2)-5(3).
Id.
77 Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting, supra note 9, at Art. 5(4)-5(5).
78 Id.
79 Id. at Art. 5(6)-5(7).
80 Id.
81 Id. at Art. 6 – Art. 11.
82 Id. at Art. 6(1)-6(3).
83 Avi-Yonah & Xu, supra note 57, at Part 2.7.2.
84 Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting, supra note 9, at Art. 7(1).
76
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so comports with the purpose of the applicable provision of the CTA.85 The
other exception permits the taxpayer to receive the benefit when the
taxpayer would have received the CTA benefit even if it had not engaged in
the pertinent behavior in order to obtain the treaty benefit.86
Article 7 also provides what the MLI refers to as the “Simplified
Limitation on Benefits Provision”87 Under this rule, most of the benefits
provided by the CTA are only available to residents of one of the signing
jurisdictions that are “qualified person[s].”88 The exceptions to this are: (1)
CTA provisions that determine residency of taxpayers other than
individuals who are residents of more than one contracting jurisdiction
under the CTA rules; (2) CTA provisions allowing for tax adjustments in
one contracting jurisdiction corresponding to tax adjustments made by the
other contracting jurisdiction; and (3) CTA provisions that allow residents
of the contracting jurisdictions to request that the competent authority of the
contracting jurisdiction consider a tax case.89 “Qualified person[s]” include
individuals, government entities of either contracting jurisdiction, publicly
traded entities, certain non-profit entities, government employee benefit
related-entities, and entities owned at least 50% by “qualified person[s]” for
at least half of the days of a twelve-month period including the time when
the benefit would be accorded.90
Additionally, residents of the contracting jurisdictions can receive
treaty benefits if they are “engaged in the active conduct of a business” in
their jurisdiction of residence and they generate income in the other
jurisdiction as a result of that business.91 In such cases, they are entitled to
CTA benefits for income that has arisen in the other jurisdiction from their
business activity or that of a connected person in the other jurisdiction if
that business activity is substantially related to, or complementary to,
business conducted in the other jurisdiction.92 Finally, a resident of a
contracting jurisdiction can receive a CTA benefit if that resident is owned
at least 75% by persons who are entitled to those tax benefits or more
favorable ones for at least half of the days of a twelve-month period,
including the time when the benefit would be accorded.93 These provisions
make it more difficult for non-residents to benefit from tax treaty provisions
in jurisdictions in which they are not residents, potentially eliminating
85

Id.
Id. at Art. 7(4).
87 Id. at Art. 7(6).
88 Id. at Art. 7(8).
89 Id.
90
Id. at Art. 7(9).
91 Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting, supra note 9, at Art. 7(10).
92 Id.; Avi-Yonah & Xu, supra note 57, at Part 2.7.2.
93 Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting, supra note 9, at Art. 7(11).
86
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many tax-planning opportunities.
Article 8 of the MLI limits the degree to which internationally paid
dividends that are exempt from tax are also deductible under a CTA.94
Specifically, under Article 8, CTA provisions that reduce or eliminate tax
on dividends from a company in one contracting jurisdiction to an owner in
the other contracting jurisdiction only apply if the owner has had the
requisite ownership interest for a 365-day period.95 This theoretically
reduces opportunities for businesses to receive treaty benefits on dividends
received from stock held for only a short amount of time.
Article 9 of the MLI makes it more difficult to avoid capital gain
taxation under CTAs by contributing real property to a business entity
shortly before selling an interest in the entity.96 Article 9 allows for the
taxing of gains a resident of one contracting jurisdiction recognizes on the
sale of an interest in an entity by the other contracting jurisdiction in certain
circumstances.97 These circumstances are met if, at any point during the 365
days preceding the sale, more than a certain portion of the property owned
by the entity in which the interest is being sold derives from real property
located in the jurisdiction of which the taxpayer is not a resident.98 Article 9
also allows a contracting jurisdiction to tax the gains that an entity in the
other contracting jurisdiction recognizes on the alienation of an interest in
another entity, if those interests derived more than 50% of their value from
real property in the first contracting jurisdiction at any time during the prior
365 days.99 These provisions would make it difficult for entities selling
interests in enterprises holding large amounts of real property to avoid
taxation by contributing the real property shortly before selling the interest.
Article 10 addresses the OECD’s concerns that taxpayers use PEs in
third jurisdictions to avoid taxation in both of the parties to a bilateral tax
treaty.100 This provision envisions a scenario in which a business located in
Jurisdiction A generates income in Jurisdiction B, but Jurisdiction A treats
the income as attributable to a PE in Jurisdiction C, and thus does not tax
the income.101 In such cases, the MLI denies the benefits of an applicable
CTA to any such item of income on which Jurisdiction C’s tax is less than
60% of the tax Jurisdiction A would have imposed had the PE been in
Jurisdiction A.102 Furthermore, that income will be taxable to Jurisdiction B
94

Avi-Yonah & Xu, supra note 57, at Part 2.7.3.
Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting, supra note 9, at Art. 8(1).
96 Avi-Yonah & Xu, supra note 57, at Part 2.7.4.
97 Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting, supra note 9, at Art. 8(1).
98 Id.
99 Id. at Art. 9(4).
100 Id. at Art. 10.
101 Id. at Art. 10(1).
102 Id.
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under its domestic law.103
There are two exceptions to this. The first is when the income
attributed to the PE in Jurisdiction C is related to the active conduct of a
business done by the PE.104 The second is when the pertinent tax authority
in Jurisdiction B in the above example (after consulting with Jurisdiction
A’s tax authority) determines that granting the benefits of the CTA is
justified due to the reason the taxpayer failed to meet the test above.105 This
provision of the MLI theoretically limits the ability of businesses to use
inactive PEs to shift income out of high tax jurisdictions into low or no-tax
jurisdictions.
As the last article of Part III of the MLI, Article 11 limits the
restrictions that CTAs place on contracting jurisdiction’s ability to tax their
own residents, thus preserving the ability of tax jurisdictions to tax their
own residents.106 It does this by stating that a CTA does not affect the
ability of a contracting jurisdiction to tax its residents except in ten
enumerated areas.107 This article thus strives to provide fewer opportunities
under tax treaties for entities to avoid paying taxes to their jurisdiction of
residence.
Part IV of the MLI focuses on Action Seven of the BEPS Project and
thus strives to make it more difficult for entities to artificially avoid PE
status.108 Article 12 of the MLI makes it more difficult for entities to avoid
PE status. The article provides that a business will have a PE in a
contracting jurisdiction where a person acts on behalf of the business and
habitually concludes or principally negotiates contracts in the business’s
name for the transfer property rights owned by the business or that commit
the business to providing services.109 There is an exception to this rule
where the business conducts these activities through a fixed place of
business and the activities would be insufficient to make that fixed place of
business a PE under the CTA.110 There is also an exception where the
person concluding or negotiating contracts does so as an independent agent
under the terms of the treaty in the ordinary course of business.111 Thus, this
103 Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting, supra note 9; Avi-Yonah & Xu, supra note 57, at Part 2.7.5.
104
Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting, supra note 9, at Art. 10(2). There are some exceptions to this
exception as well.
105 Id. at Art. 10(3).
106 Avi-Yonah & Xu, supra note 57, at 2.7.6.
107 Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting, supra note 9, at Art. 11(1).
108 Id. at Art. 12 – Art. 15; Action Plan, supra note 3, at 19-20.
109 Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting, supra note 9, at Art 12(1).
110 Id.
111 Id. at Art. 12(2).
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article, in spite of the exceptions, seeks to limit the ability of international
business enterprises to have agents operating in foreign tax jurisdictions
without creating a PE.
Article 13 of the MLI provides two options for contracting
jurisdictions to limit the ability of business enterprises to avoid PE status
determined by their activities.112 Option A establishes that only certain
enumerated activities, including those included in a CTA as well as the
maintenance of a fixed place of business solely for any activity included in
the CTA, are permitted without causing a PE.113 A combination of exempt
activities must be limited to those “of a preparatory or auxiliary
character.”114 Option B includes much of the same language as Option A
but provides a few additional restrictions on activity that does not constitute
PE status.115 Additionally, Option B provides that a fixed place of business
will be accorded PE status where the business operating that fixed place or
a related business carries on other business activities in the same tax
jurisdiction as the fixed place of business that constitutes a PE, or makes the
overall level of activity in the jurisdiction not of “a preparatory or auxiliary
character.”116 Under this additional rule, PE status only applies where the
business activities of the enterprise in the jurisdiction are “complementary
functions that are part of a cohesive business operation.”117 This seeks to
limit businesses’ abilities to avoid PE status by conducting business
activities discretely within a given tax jurisdiction.
Article 14 of the MLI limits the ability of international businesses to
avoid PE status by temporally separating certain activities in a tax
jurisdiction.118 Article 14 envisions a scenario in which a business from
Contracting Jurisdiction A conducts activities in connection with a building
site or other location listed in the CTA or the MLI in Contracting
Jurisdiction B.119 In such cases,
 if the activities take place over more than an aggregate of thirty
days, or
 if the activities are for a period of time exceeding thirty days if
done by businesses “closely related to the first-mentioned”
business, 120
112

Id. at Art. 13.
Id. at Art. 13(2).
114 Id.
115 Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting, supra note 9, at Art. 13(3).
116 Id.
117
Id. at Art. 13(4).
118 Avi-Yonah & Xu, supra note 57, at Part 2.8.3.
119 Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting, supra note 9, at Art. 14(1).
120 Id. at Art. 15. Article 15 of the MLI defines a “Person Closely Related to an
Enterprise” to be a person that controls or is controlled by the other person, or a person that
113
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these activities will be added to the aggregate period of time that the “first
mentioned” business carried activities at that location.121 In essence, this
provision of the MLI forces businesses to include short periods of time, or
somewhat longer periods of time in the case of related businesses, in their
aggregate amount of time working at a location in another tax jurisdiction.
This makes it harder for businesses to avoid PE status by doing work in
other countries through separate entities or by engaging in activities in other
countries for short, discrete periods at a time.122
Part V of the MLI focuses on Action Fourteen of the BEPS Project:
more effective dispute resolution mechanisms.123 The first article of this
part, Article 16, establishes some of the procedures for determining how the
contracting jurisdictions resolve tax disputes that arise under the MLI. 124
Under this article, referred to as the Mutual Agreement Procedure (MAP), a
person who “considers” the actions of at least one of the contracting
jurisdictions to tax that person in violation of the CTA may present its case
to either jurisdiction’s tax authority.125 This must be done within three years
of the “first notification” of the action that results in the taxation in
violation of the CTA.126
When a person brings such a case and the authority to which the
person brought its case cannot resolve the issue, the tax authorities of the
contracting jurisdictions are to seek mutual agreement in accordance with
the CTA in resolving the issue.127 The tax authorities of the jurisdictions are
also to endeavor to resolve difficulties or doubts in the interpretation or
application of the CTA.128 This provision thus provides for the ability of
persons to present grievances under the CTA and expresses the intent for
the tax jurisdictions to resolve issues under the CTA in agreement with each
other.
Article 17 strives to address situations in which both contracting
jurisdictions attempt to tax the same income from two different
enterprises.129 This article envisions a scenario in which Jurisdiction A
is under the control of the same persons or enterprises as the other, closely related person.
Whether this part of the definition is met is based on a facts and circumstances test.
Additionally, a person is closely related to another person where one of the persons directly
or indirectly “possesses” more than 50% of the “beneficial interest” (both vote and value) in
the other, or if another person possesses more than 50% of the beneficial interest of both
persons.
121 Id. at Art. 14(1).
122 Avi-Yonah & Xu, supra note 57, at 2.8.3.
123 Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting, supra note 9, at Art. 16 – Art. 17.
124 Id. at Art. 16.
125 Id. at Art. 16(1).
126 Id.
127 Id. at Art. 16(2).
128 Id. at Art. 16(3).
129 Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base
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includes in the (taxable) profits of a domestic enterprise, amounts that
Jurisdiction B has attributed as (taxable) profits to an enterprise located in
Jurisdiction B.130 In such cases, if the profits would have been attributable
to the enterprise in Jurisdiction A had the “conditions” between the
enterprises been those of independent enterprises, Jurisdiction B must
adjust its tax on those profits.131 Such an adjustment should be made in
accordance with the CTA, and the tax authorities of the jurisdictions are to
consult with each other “if necessary.”132 This provision of the MLI thus
provides procedures for tax jurisdictions to unilaterally address certain
issues brought by taxpayers.133
Part VI of the MLI also seeks to advance Action Fourteen of the BEPS
Project.134 It does this by providing for binding arbitration of certain tax
controversies brought within one of the contracting jurisdictions.135 Article
19 of the MLI provides for arbitration when a party brings an action on a
tax controversy under Article 16 of the MLI (the MAP), thus claiming that
one or both of the jurisdictions is taxing it in violation of the applicable
CTA.136 Specifically, where the tax authorities of the two contracting
jurisdictions are unable to resolve the controversy within two years of one
of several specified dates, any unresolved issues from the case are
submitted to binding arbitration, if the party bringing the suit so desires.137
The arbitration is then implemented by mutual agreement.138
There are several situations in which the arbitration is not binding on
the tax jurisdictions.139 The first situation is when “a person directly
affected by the case” does not withdraw issues resolved via the arbitration
from consideration within sixty days of the notification of mutual
agreement following the arbitration process.140 The second situation is
when a court within the territory of one of the contracting jurisdictions
holds that the arbitration decision is invalid.141 A third situation is when “a
person directly affected by the case” litigates on the issues that had already
been resolved by the mutual agreement procedure which implemented the
Erosion and Profit Shifting, supra note 9, at Art. 17.
130 Avi-Yonah & Xu, supra note 57, at 2.9.2.
131 Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting, supra note 9, at Art. 17(1).
132 Id.
133 Avi-Yonah & Xu, supra note 57, at 2.9.2.
134 See Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, supra note 9, at Art. 18 – Art. 26.
135 Id. at Art. 19.
136 Id.
137 Id. at Art. 19(1).
138 Avi-Yonah & Xu, supra note 57, at 2.10.2.
139 Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting, supra note 9, at Art. 19(4).
140 Id.
141 Id.
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arbitration decision..142 Under Article 22, should the tax authorities of the
contracting jurisdictions reach an agreement to resolve the issues or the
person who brought the case withdraws it prior to the delivery of the
arbitration decision, the arbitration proceedings are terminated.143 Finally,
under Article 24, if the contracting jurisdictions reach a different agreement
on all the issues within three calendar months of the delivery of the
arbitration decision, the arbitration decision is not binding.144 The
remaining provisions of Part VI of the MLI establish procedures for
selecting arbitrators, ensuring confidentiality through the arbitration
process, determining the type of arbitration process, handling arbitration
costs, and other procedural matters regarding arbitration of tax issues.145
Part VI of the MLI thus generally, but not universally, subjects tax
jurisdictions to binding arbitration on many issues under CTAs.
Therefore, the MLI includes provisions that aim to address many of
the BEPS Project’s concerns. Under Action Fifteen, the MLI includes
provisions that seek to limit the effects of certain types of “hybrid mismatch
agreements” by limiting the degree to which entities can obtain tax relief
from both contracting jurisdictions simultaneously.146 It also includes
numerous provisions to prevent “treaty abuse” by limiting the
circumstances in which taxpayers can receive various treaty benefits, such
as deductions related to dividends.147 The MLI also includes a variety of
mechanisms to make it more difficult to avoid PE status through what the
OECD considers to be artificial maneuvers.148 Finally, the MLI includes
numerous provisions to facilitate the resolution of tax disputes under a
CTA. Such provisions include the assurance that injured taxpayers will
have a venue in which to seek relief,149 the assurance that the contracting
jurisdictions will attempt to reach an agreement between each other on tax
issues arising under the CTAs,150 and the assurance that binding arbitration
is an option when the contracting jurisdictions cannot reach an agreement
on CTA tax issues presented.151 Thus, the MLI provisions do attempt to
address some of the BEPS Project’s concerns.

142

Id.
Id. at Art. 22.
144 Id. at Art. 24.
145 Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting, supra note 9, at Art. 18 – Art. 26.
146 Id. at Art. 3 – Art. 5.
147 Id. at Art. 6 – Art. 11.
148 Id. at Art. 12 – Art. 15.
149 Id. at Art. 16.
150 Id. at Art. 17.
151 Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting, supra note 9, at Art. 18 – Art. 26.
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IV. THE WEAKNESSES OF THE MLI PROVISIONS
Despite the efforts to resolve many of the BEPS Project’s concerns,
the MLI itself ultimately does not provide final solutions to the BEPS
Actions and will ultimately be largely ineffective at reducing BEPS. As the
MLI itself indicates, it is “flexible.”152 While in some cases this means that
the MLI provides multiple options for signing jurisdictions, in many cases,
this provides tax jurisdictions with the opportunity to reject entire
provisions of the MLI. The impact of a tax jurisdiction’s rejection of an
MLI provision is magnified by the fact that where one of the parties to a
CTA has made reservations against a provision of the MLI, the provision
will not apply to that CTA.153 Although there are some mandatory
provisions within the MLI, they are relatively few in number.154
Accordingly, signing the MLI does not, in and of itself, mean that tax
jurisdictions are committing to abide by all, or even most, of the MLI’s
provisions.
Indeed, many of the MLI’s strictest and otherwise most impactful
provisions are either optional or can be opted out of by signing
jurisdictions. The entirety of Part II of the MLI, addressing what the OECD
calls “hybrid mismatches,” is optional for signing parties.155 Accordingly,
the mere signing of the MLI does not necessarily bind a tax jurisdiction to
classify transparent entity income as that of a resident, take measures to
prevent double non-taxation, or to do anything to address Action Two of
the BEPS Project.156 Indeed, of the seventy-eight tax jurisdictions that have
signed the MLI as of the date of this writing, fifty-nine have indicated that
they do not intend to apply Article 3 in its entirety, fifty-six have indicated
that they do not intend to apply Article 4 in its entirety, and forty-three have
indicated that they do not intend to apply one of the options in Article 5 to
their CTAs.157
The MLI provisions dealing with the prevention of treaty abuse
require only slightly more action from signing jurisdictions. Specifically, all
but Article 6, Article 7, and Article 9 within Part III of the MLI are
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Frequently Asked Questions on the Multilateral Instrument (MLI), supra note 7, at 4.
Jack Bernstein, It Takes Two to Tango, 88 TAX NOTES INT’L 1073, (2017).
154 Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting, supra note 9, at Art. 19(4).
155 Id. at Art. 3 – Art. 5.
156 See id.
157 See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., Signatories and Parties to the
Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion
and Profit Shifting, supra note 2. For the purposes of these numbers, tax jurisdictions that do
not intend to apply a particular MLI provision because they believe comparable substance is
already reflected in their treaties are considered to intend to apply the MLI provision. The
accuracy of this assumption obviously depends on the accuracy of the language of individual
tax treaties.
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completely optional.158 Thus, the measures limiting the tax exemption of
international dividends,159 the provisions limiting the ability of entities to
avoid tax by conducting business through entities in third jurisdictions,160
and the provisions limiting the exceptions to a tax jurisdiction’s ability to
tax its own residents are entirely optional.161
Even under the articles that carry mandatory requirements, the
requirements are relatively minimal. Under Article 6, signing jurisdictions
must only commit to including in their CTAs a preamble indicating their
desire to eliminate double-taxation and double non-taxation.162 Article 7
only mandates the application of the principal purpose test. Article 7 leaves
the Simplified Limitation on Benefits Provision , which makes it more
difficult for businesses to receive treaty benefits, optional.163 Article 9 also
permits signing jurisdictions to refrain from applying paragraph (1), which
provides for the taxing of gain on the alienation of interests an entity holds
in another entity that derive a certain amount of their value from real
property in another contracting jurisdiction.164 As of the date of this writing,
forty-three of the signing jurisdictions have indicated that they do not
intend to fully apply Article 8; at least forty-six have indicated that they do
not intend to fully apply Article 9; fifty-seven have indicated that they do
not intend to fully apply Article 10; and fifty-five have indicated that they
do not intend to fully apply the provisions of Article 11 to their CTAs.165
In addition, the entirety of Part IV of the MLI is optional for signing
jurisdictions.166 These articles, which target the ability of businesses to
avoid PE status through “artificial” tax maneuvers, are thus not inherently
binding on signing jurisdictions.167 At the time of this writing, forty-three
signing jurisdictions have expressed their intent not to apply the provisions
of Article 12; thirty have expressed their intent to not apply the provisions
of Article 13; fifty-seven have expressed their intent to not fully apply
Article 14; and thirty-four have expressed their intent to not fully apply the
Article 15 definitions to their CTAs.168
158 Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting, supra note 9, at Art. 6, Art. 7, and Art. 9.
159 Id. at Art. 8.
160 Id. at Art. 10.
161
Id. at Art. 11.
162 Id. at Art. 6.
163 Id. at Art. 7.
164 Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting, supra note 9, at Art. 9.
165 See Signatories and Parties to the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty
Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, supra note 2.
166 Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting, supra note 9, at Art. 12 – Art. 15.
167 Id.
168 See Signatories and Parties to the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty
Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, supra note 2.
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Additionally, many of the efforts to improve dispute resolution
measures are optional. The entire provision for binding arbitration is
optional,169 and only twenty-eight signing jurisdictions have indicated their
intent to apply it to their CTAs.170 In general, the provisions of Part V of the
MLI are required by signers of the MLI unless the CTA is covered by
otherwise comparable dispute resolution measures.171
Finally, the MLI provisions do not even seek to address many of the
OECD’s primary concerns about BEPS. As the BEPS Project actions
indicate, many of the primary opportunities for BEPS are really the result of
domestic laws rather than provisions in treaties.172 Domestic law must
address issues such as characterizing income to reflect what the OECD sees
as economic reality, adjusting taxation of controlled foreign corporations
(Action 3), and changing domestic law on transfer pricing (Action 13).173
Although this issue is not unique to the particular text of the MLI, the need
for domestic laws to change in order to comprehensively reduce BEPS
severely limits the effectiveness of the MLI at reducing BEPS. Thus, there
are relatively few binding obligations that signing the MLI inherently
entails. Binding provisions include the requirement to express a desire to
avoid double-taxation without providing opportunities for double nontaxation, adopt the principal purpose test, and commit to trying to reach an
agreement with the other contracting tax jurisdiction on certain tax disputes
arising under a CTA.174 However, the enforcement of these commitments is
largely left to the individual tax jurisdictions.175 The mere fact that a tax
jurisdiction ratifies the MLI does not inherently mean that it has committed
to taking significant substantive measures to reduce BEPS.176 Indeed, most
of the optional articles of the MLI are not expected to be fully applied by
169

Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting, supra note 9, at Art. 18.
170 See Signatories and Parties to the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty
Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, supra note 2.
171 Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting, supra note 9, at Art. 16 – Art. 17.
172 Action Plan, supra note 3; see Michael V. Sala, Breaking Down BEPS: Strategies,
Reforms, and Planning Responses, 47 CONN. L. REV. 573, 604 (2014).
173 Action Plan, supra note 3.
174 Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting, supra note 9, at Art. 6, Art. 7, and Art. 16.
175 See id.
176 As of this writing, only four signing jurisdictions have ratified the MLI: Austria, the
Isle of Man, Jersey, and Poland. However, three of these have expressed the intent to not
fully apply most of the optional provisions of the MLI. The other seventy-four signing
jurisdictions have merely expressed which provisions of the MLI they hope to ratify through
their domestic ratification process. It is thus entirely possible that if/when tax jurisdictions
ratify the MLI, they will reject more of the optional provisions than their representatives
originally hoped to ratify. See Signatories and Parties to the Multilateral Convention to
Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, supra
note 2.
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the majority of signing jurisdictions.
V. WHY TAX JURISDICTIONS ARE UNLIKELY TO ABIDE BY
THE MLI’S PROVISIONS
As indicated above, even the tax jurisdictions that signed the MLI
have generally not committed themselves to taking many substantive steps
in order to reduce BEPS. Nevertheless, that does not mean that the MLI
will not be effective in reducing BEPS. It is theoretically conceivable that
tax jurisdictions would willingly implement policies recommended by the
BEPS Project under the BEPS Actions, particularly those reflected in the
MLI. However, the goals of the MLI and BEPS Project more generally
often conflict with many of the policy interests that non-signing and signing
jurisdictions may have. Accordingly, with its mostly optional and largely
unenforceable provisions, the MLI is unlikely to be effective in reducing
BEPS.
In the first place, going beyond the bare linguistic requirements of the
MLI to reduce BEPS in the treaty context requires tax jurisdictions to
surrender a degree of their control over their taxing authority. Although
Parts V and VI of the MLI provide means for tax jurisdictions to avoid
submitting to or even reaching agreements on tax treaty provisions, the idea
of these provisions is that tax jurisdictions will resolve international tax
issues either by mutual agreement or arbitration.177 Such activity by a tax
jurisdiction requires a tax jurisdiction to potentially change its taxing
activities on the basis of another tax jurisdiction or the arbitrators, thus
surrendering a measure of control over its own taxes. As taxes are the
primary means by which the taxing entities raise revenue, tax jurisdictions
tend to strongly avoid giving up control of them.178
Furthermore, as the power to tax is not only the power to destroy, but
also the power to regulate and incentivize private actors, tax jurisdictions
have a strong incentive to retain as much control over their tax schemes as
possible.179 Indeed, fear of losing this autonomy is thought to be a reason
why some tax jurisdictions have refused to sign the MLI at all.180 In order to
preserve control over their own ability to raise revenue, even signing
jurisdictions are unlikely to go beyond the minimum amount required by
the language of the MLI to which they adhere.
Second, efforts to reduce BEPS beyond the strict language of the MLI
require tax jurisdictions to be more transparent with the international
177

See Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, supra note 9, at Art. 16 – Art. 26.
178 See Grinberg, supra note 8, 1155.
179 See Mark Bowler-Smith, Can Sovereign Interests be Aligned with International Tax
Cooperation?, 2017 N.Z.L. REV. 207, 209-10 (2017).
180 See Lucas de Lima Carhalho, The MLI and Mutual Agreement Procedure: Improving
Tax Treaty Dispute Resolution in Brazil, 2017 WTD 176-10, September 13, 2017.
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community as to both their tax schemes and the financial information of
entities operating within their borders. In addition to providing a
competitive advantage for attracting business activity,181 a lack of
transparency as to tax information of those operating inside a tax
jurisdiction’s borders can be seen as necessary for protecting the tax regime
itself from external pressures.182 This desire for tax jurisdictions to avoid
greater transparency will incentivize signing jurisdictions of the MLI to
avoid going beyond the language of the MLI to prevent BEPS.
Finally, the MLI and BEPS Project’s fundamental goal of increasing
the effective tax rates on international enterprises conflicts with the interests
of many tax jurisdictions, including those who have signed the MLI. 183 As
is commonly accepted, under a competitive tax regime, many tax
jurisdictions seek to reduce the taxes they collect from entities that they
desire to engage in activity within their borders.184 Clearly, these
jurisdictions, such as Ireland, have a strong incentive to avoid more heavily
taxing international entities operating in their borders.185 Furthermore,
while the OECD has documented the extent to which it believes
governments miss collecting tax revenues because of BEPS, the significant
increase in global tax revenues over periods of decreasing nominal tax rates
may lead some tax jurisdictions to refrain from combating BEPS in the
interest of preserving tax revenue.186 Thus, in the interest of protecting their
own tax revenue, tax jurisdictions may refrain from vigorously applying the
standards of the MLI to reduce BEPS.
It is also worth noting that several jurisdictions with a substantial
impact on global business have not signed the MLI. Of these, the most
influential is the United States.187 Because of its economic and political
influence, the United States has historically dominated international tax
policy and continues to have significant influence over the outcomes of
international tax policies.188 Various facets of the United States’ federal
government have expressed resistance to signing the MLI on the grounds
that it disproportionately targets U.S. firms.189 Additionally, Brazil has not
181 See Tsilly Dagan, International Tax and Global Justice, 18 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 1, 24 (2017).
182 See Grinberg, supra note 8, at 1165-1169.
183 Action Plan, supra note 3, at 7-11.
184 See Grinberg, supra note 8, at 1154.
185 See Stephanie Johnston Soong, Ireland’s Strong Corporate Tax Take Sustainable to
2020, Review Says, 2017 WTD 176-2, Sep. 13, 2017.
186 Sala, supra note 172, at 577.
187 Rifat Azam, Ruling the World: Generating International Tax Norms in the Era of
Globalization and BEPS, 50 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 517, 562 (2017).
188 Id.
189 Id.; Ramon Tomazela, Brazil’s Absence from the Multilateral BEPS Convention and
the New Amending Protocol Signed between Brazil and Argentina, Kluwer International Tax
Blog (Sep. 5, 2017), http://kluwertaxblog.com/2017/09/05/brazils-absence-multilateral-bepsconvention-new-amending-protocol-signed-brazil-argentina/.
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signed the MLI, and has expressed a preference for engaging in bilateral
changes to its existing tax treaties.190 As long as countries such as Brazil
and the United States continue to resist signing the MLI at all, the MLI’s
impact will be limited in reducing BEPS.
Thus, the MLI will generally be ineffective at achieving BEPS
objectives. While the BEPS Project seeks to prevent entities from using
“artificial” maneuvers to minimize global taxation, the provisions of the
MLI that confront those maneuvers are generally optional or fail to
comprehensively address the BEPS objectives. Indeed, many of the BEPS
objectives are beyond the scope of the MLI. Furthermore, even the
jurisdictions that have signed the MLI have little incentive to take action
beyond the letter of the MLI to prevent BEPS. Accordingly, “mock
compliance” with the MLI is likely from many of the signing
jurisdictions.191 This means that the MLI, although it expresses an
international desire to address BEPS, ultimately is not likely to effectively
reduce BEPS.
VI. CONCLUSION
The MLI is the product of several years of work by the OECD to
develop measures to reduce BEPS. It attempts to apply several of the action
items that the OECD has identified as being particularly important in
reducing BEPS. However, the impact of this document will likely be
constrained by the selective, optional nature of many of its provisions,
which do not require signing jurisdictions to commit themselves to taking
significant measures to reduce BEPS. Indeed, some of the most influential
tax jurisdictions have refused to even sign the MLI. Furthermore, those
jurisdictions which have signed the MLI are often incentivized to apply its
provisions sparingly. Thus, while it likely reflects many increasingly
accepted principles of international taxation, the MLI is likely to have a
limited impact on global taxation.
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Tomazela, supra note 190.
See Grinberg, supra note 8, at 1176-1177.
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